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Abstract 
We study the co-existence of two community-based institutions for fisheries management in 
Benin: a traditional institution embedded in the Voodoo religion and a recent secular institution 
in the form of fishing committees. Using household survey data on fishing activities, we find 
that rules of both institutions have a statistically significant but small impact on the use of 
unsustainable fishing gear. We further find that Voodoo fishers who break the traditional 
Voodoo-based rule follow the fishing committee rule to the same extent as other fishers. This 
finding is consistent with a possible transition from the traditional Voodoo-based institution to 
the secular fishing committee institution. More research is needed to fully assess the 
effectiveness of, and interactions between, the two institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Around the globe, marine and inland fishery stocks are being overexploited (Allan et al., 2005; 
FAO, 2012). The importance of small-scale fisheries for food security and poverty alleviation 
stresses the need for sustainable fisheries management (FAO, 2014). Community-based natural 
resource management has been advocated as an effective and sustainable resource management 
strategy under certain conditions (Agrawal, 2001; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Berkes, 1989; 
Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990), in particular for small-scale fisheries (Berkes, 2001; Pinkerton, 
2011). 
Community-based natural resource management is often integrated in traditional culture 
or religion, relying on institutions such as sacred sites and taboos (Berkes, 2008; Berkes et al., 
2000; Bhagwat and Rutte, 2006; Colding and Folke, 2001; Dudley et al., 2009; Jones et al., 
2008). Although traditional resource management is often undermined by socio-economic 
modernization and the introduction of new institutions and religions, case studies find that 
traditional religions continue to regulate resource exploitation and conservation  today (Deb 
and Malhotra, 2001; Eneji et al., 2012; Kajembe et al., 2003; Kokou et al., 2008; Ntiamoa-
Baidu, 2008; Ormsby and Bhagwat, 2010; Sharma et al., 1999; Veitayaki et al., 2011).  
In this paper we examine community-based fisheries management at Lake Nokoué in 
Benin. The lake fisheries provide a livelihood to artisanal fishing communities, but are severely 
affected by overfishing and resource degradation (FAO, 2008; Gnohossou, 2006). Fishing was 
historically regulated by an institution embedded in Voodoo, the traditional animistic religion 
of Benin (Bourgoignie, 1972; Clédjo, 2006; Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980). After 
colonization, socio-economic changes undermined the influence of the Voodoo religion and 
Voodoo-based institutions. The erosion of traditional fisheries management in combination 
with failing government institutions, strong population pressure and the rising value of fishery 
products resulted in increasingly severe overfishing (Dangbégnon, 2000). In the 1990s the 
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fishing communities attempted to curb this negative trend by creating committees to regulate 
fishing activities (Atti-Mama, 1998). 
These fishing committees issued rules that differ and sometimes conflict with traditional 
Voodoo-based rules. For instance, both the committees and the traditional institution formulate 
a rule concerning the konou – a highly productive fishing technique that makes use of fine mesh 
nets. The traditional rule bans the use of the fine meshed konou at all times (Clédjo, 2006; Pliya, 
1980), while the fishing committees impose a periodical prohibition: open weeks – in which 
the use of the konou is allowed – alternate with closed weeks – in which the konou is banned. 
In this dual institutional setting we examine three empirical questions. First, does the 
traditional Voodoo-based rule still keep Voodoo fishers from using the fine meshed konou? 
Second, does the fishing committee rule keep fishers from using the konou in closed weeks? 
Third, do Voodoo fishers who break the traditional Voodoo rule comply in any way to the 
fishing committee rule? 
To answer these questions, we perform an empirical analysis using two different 
datasets. The first is taken from a 2006 fishery census implemented by the Beninese 
government, and contains information for 5,852 fishermen across 34 villages near lake Nokoué. 
The second is a 2009 household survey implemented by the authors, and contains weekly 
information on fishing activities across 14 weeks for 103 fishermen living near lake Nokoué. 
While the large census allows us to better control for village level heterogeneity, the household 
survey has the advantage of a weekly time dimension. To contextualize our analysis we went 
back to the field in 2013 and surveyed 137 fishers at lake Nokoué, collecting additional 
information about fishermen’s perceptions of fishery institutions. 
To examine compliance to the traditional Voodoo-based rule we explore the conditional 
correlation between Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou, both in the large census data 
and in the household survey data. To examine compliance to the fishing committee rule we 
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study the relation between the use of the konou and the closing of the lake across weeks. As 
this approach requires a time dimension, we use the household survey data. We also use the 
survey data to study how Voodoo fishers who break the traditional rule behave towards the 
fishing committee rule. More specifically, we explore the relation between the use of the konou 
and the interaction term between Voodoo adherence and the closing of the lake.  
To our knowledge this is the first study that quantitatively examines the compliance of 
resource users to rules formulated by a traditional institution as well as a competing secular 
institution. In addition, we did not find studies discussing the interaction between traditional 
and recent management institutions, i.e. how resource users who break with traditional rules 
behave towards recent alternative rules. Benin provides an ideal testing ground to answer these 
questions because of its particular setting of dual community-based fishery institutions and 
because of its remarkable religious tolerance and pluralism, which manifests itself amongst 
others in considerable variation in religious adherence within villages (Barbier and Dorier-
Apprill, 2002). We can therefore compare the behaviour of fishers who explicitly identify 
themselves with Voodoo to fishers who follow other religions while controlling for village-
level characteristics. 
The next section discusses fishery management institutions and the social-ecological system 
of lake fisheries in southern Benin. Section 3 presents our data and Section 4 explains the 
methodology used to analyse the data. Section 5 presents our results, and in Section 6 we 
investigate a number of competing explanations for our findings. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. The lake fisheries of southern Benin 
2.1. The social-ecological system 
We study fishing communities living in the commune So-Ava near lake Nokoué in the south of 
Benin (see Figure 1). Lake Nokoué is the largest water body in Benin and part of the most 
productive water basin, accounting for 65 to 70 percent of inland fisheries production 
(Gnohossou, 2006). In the course of history different ethnic groups settled around the lake and 
specialized in fishing activities (Bourgoignie, 1972; Pliya, 1989, 1980). Today the communities 
have a long-established tradition of artisanal fishing that dates back several generation, and 
industrial fishing remains absent (Atti-Mama, 1998). 
In recent years, the coastal lakes in Benin suffered from severe environmental 
degradation and overfishing (FAO, 2008; Gnohossou, 2006).1 As the fishing communities have 
few income activities outside the fishery sector, they are particularly vulnerable to resource 
degradation (Stoop et al., 2013).2 Instead of diversifying their income, the communities cope 
with the rising pressure on their livelihoods by developing more productive fishing technologies. 
One of the most important innovations in fishing techniques was the introduction of the konou 
in the 1980s. 
The konou (or medokpokonou) is a fixed fishing installation used in circulating water 
that consists of a long (100 to 400 m) central rectangular net with several pouches (République 
du Bénin, 2008). This structure and the length of the net make the konou one of the most 
productive fishing instruments used at lake Nokoué. However, because of these features 
installing and harvesting the konou requires considerable physical effort. 
                                                          
1 In the 2006 fishery census about 99 % of more than 14,000 fishers at lake Nokoué report that the size of catches 
and average catches have declined in the last 3 years.  
2 In the 2009 household survey over 85 % of annual household income derives from the fishery sector (see Table 
A.1 in the online appendix). 
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The konou is considered an unsustainable fishing technique mainly because of the use 
of fine mesh fishing nets (20 to 5 mm). While these fine mesh nets make the konou very 
productive, especially for shrimp fishing, they undermine the sustainability of the fishery stock 
by catching juveniles and even eggs (République du Bénin, 2008). 
2.2. Fisheries management 
The traditional Voodoo-based institution 
Voodoo (Vodun) is an animistic religion found along the coast of West Africa (Ghana, Togo, 
Benin, Nigeria). From the end of the 16th century until the colonization and subsequent 
introduction of Christian religions, Voodoo was the dominant religion in South Benin and 
played a fundamental part in all aspects of society (Bourgoignie, 1972; Tall, 1995b). 
In the world view of Voodoo, the natural world is connected to a supreme divine force 
through Voodoo deities (Bourgoignie, 1972; Tall, 1995a). These deities are immaterial beings, 
neither human nor divine, that belong to the spirit world. Each spirit is connected to and controls 
specific natural elements such as trees or water bodies. Voodoo spirits are both respected and 
feared, as they will help mankind when appeased, but will inflict punishments such as flooding, 
sickness or even death when offended. 
The Voodoo religion gave birth to institutions that regulated the exploitation of natural 
resources. One example is the sacred forest, found throughout Benin and Togo (Juhé-Beaulaton 
and Roussel, 2002; Kokou et al., 2008). The southern lakes of Benin provide another example. 
Voodoo spirits are believed to control the movements of the water and its fauna (Bourgoignie, 
1972; Clédjo, 2006; Pliya, 1980), and fishing activities were regulated by a wide array of 
concrete rules and taboos embedded in Voodoo beliefs (Clédjo, 2006; Pliya, 1980). Fishing was 
for instance prohibited on days of worship (one day out of four) and in the vicinity of sacred 
sites (fétiches). The use of fine mesh nets was also prohibited. According to Clédjo (2006) these 
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rules served to limit fishing intensity and protect fishery reproduction, for instance by 
converting spawning grounds into fétiches. 
Voodoo priests were powerful religious and political leaders and played a crucial role 
in the organization, monitoring and enforcement of the traditional Voodoo-based fishery 
institution (Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980). Sanctions were applied by priests and were severe, 
ranging from the confiscation of fishing gear to public flagellation. The worst offenses were 
sanctioned by death. 
According to Pliya (1980) the traditional institution managed to keep resource 
exploitation in check, even in the face of population growth. The system started to fail, however, 
when (post-)colonial Benin underwent profound changes, such as the disappearance of 
traditional politico-religious power structures, an increasing market demand for fishery 
products and the rising popularity of Christian religions (Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980).3 
Even though the religious landscape in post-colonial Benin became dominated by 
Christianity, the traditional Voodoo religion remains influential today (Tall, 1995a). In 2011 13 
% of Beninese reported to follow traditional religion (Afrobarometer 2014). Voodoo has also 
been recorded as an official religion in the constitution and is celebrated each year in a national 
Voodoo festival.  
Similarly, the traditional fishery institution did not disappear. Several rules, taboos and 
sanctions still exist today (Clédjo, 2006; Dangbégnon, 2000; République du Bénin, 2008). One 
such rule is the taboo of fishing near fétiches. In our 2013 survey, 85 % of fishers were aware 
of such fétiches and, among these fishers, 91 % said not to fish near them. Another rule that 
remains today is the prohibition to use fine mesh nets. Although the death sentence is no longer 
applied, present-day sanctions can range from the destruction of fishing gear to heavy fines and 
even the demolition of the perpetrator’s house (Clédjo, 2006).  
                                                          
3 See online appendix C for more details. 
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The fishing committees 
In 1993 fishers created a new institution to regulate fishing activities in the form of fishing 
committees (Atti-Mama, 1998). This institution was a local response to overfishing, failing 
fisheries management and increasingly frequent conflicts. In 1997 the government legalized the 
fishing committees to increase their effectiveness (République du Bénin, 1997). As such the 
committees became a co-management institution, organized at the level of the fishing village 
but legitimized and supported by the central government (Atti-Mama, 1998). The main tasks of 
the committees – as reported by fishers in 1996 – are the settling of conflicts, implementing and 
monitoring regulations such as the meshing of nets, protecting the resource and sensitizing 
fishers (Atti-Mama, 1998). Each village or group of villages has a committee representing all 
fishers. The committee members are fishers from the village, elected in a village assembly for 
a (renewable) mandate of three years (République du Bénin, 1997).  
The fishing committees created a new rule for the konou that allows its use during four 
consecutive weeks (open weeks) and bans it for the following two weeks (closed weeks). These 
periods of open and closed weeks alternate throughout the shrimp fishing season (January – 
August) when larvae migrate from the ocean to the lake, mature and return to the ocean 
(Hoestlandt, 1939). By periodically banning the use of the konou across the entire lake, the rule 
intends to reduce the damaging impact of the konou. Fishers are well informed about the rule: 
in the 2013 survey, only one fisher said not to know it. 
The fishing committees impose a number of sanctions when the rule is violated, such as 
the confiscation of fishing gear or catches. However, the effectiveness of the sanctioning 
mechanism is said to be undermined by corruption (Dangbégnon, 2000). 
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3. Data 
3.1. Data sources 
For our empirical analysis, we rely on two different datasets. The first is a 2006 fishery census, 
administered by the Beninese government in southern Benin. The census includes individual-
level information on 27,568 actors in the fishery sector. Our analysis relies on a sample of 5,852 
fishers (full-time, part-time and seasonal fishers) living in 34 villages across 10 arrondissements 
around lake Nokoué.4  
The second dataset is a household survey administered in April-July 2009 by the authors 
among 180 households at lake Nokoué. The households were selected by taking a stratified 
random sample from the 2006 fishery census in six villages, located in two different 
arrondissements in the commune So-Ava near lake Nokoué (see Figure 1). These households 
were visited bi-weekly during a period of 14 weeks.5 Hence, in contrast to the census data the 
household survey has a time dimension. In particular, the survey provides detailed weekly 
information on the fishing activities of 200 fishermen. 
In our empirical analysis we focus on those fishermen whose main occupation is fishing 
and who were visited in all 14 weeks.6 This baseline sample counts 103 fishermen. For one 
aspect of our empirical analysis we look at a subsample of these fishers, namely the konou 
users. We define a konou user as a fisher who reports to have used the konou at least once 
during the survey period. This subsample includes 47 fishers living in five villages across two 
arrondissements.7 
                                                          
4 The arrondissement is the administrative unit in-between the village and the commune level. 
5 See online appendix B for more information on survey implementation. 
6 We explain this choice in section A.3.1.of the online appendix.  
7 One village (Sokomey) drops out compared to the baseline sample because there was no konou user among the 
sample fishers in this village. All but one of the sample fishers in Sokomey are Voodoo adherents.  
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Finally, during an additional field visit we collected supplementary information on 
fishermen’s perceptions of fishery institutions. This visit took place in April 2013, when we 
surveyed 137 fishermen across three villages at lake Nokoué. These fishers are a subsample of 
the fishers interviewed in the 2009 household survey. Table 1 summarizes the key 
characteristics of each data sample used in the paper. 
3.2.  Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics of individual and household characteristics in the 2009 household survey 
and 2006 fishery census samples are reported in the online appendix (Table A.1). Below we 
report descriptive statistics for our key variables: religious adherence and the use of konou.  
Table 2 presents the variation in religious affiliation in our two main datasets. The 
distribution is similar across the two samples, with Voodoo and Catholicism being the main 
religions. In the census 24 % of fishers are Voodoo adherents, compared to 27 % in the 
household survey. 
Table 3 presents the share of konou users among Voodoo adherents and among all other 
fishers. In both samples the share of konou users is lower among Voodoo adherents. In the 
household survey the difference is most pronounced: only 29 % of Voodoo fishers are konou 
users compared to 52 % of other fishers.8 
The bars in Figure 2 give the share of fishers that report using the konou in each week 
in the household survey. The konou is generally used less in closed weeks compared to open 
weeks, in particular in the first week of closing. The difference, although small, is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. 
                                                          
8 The difference in konou use across Voodoo adherents and other fishers is statistically significant at the 1 % level 
in the census sample and at the 2 % level in the survey sample. 
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4. Data analysis 
4.1. The traditional rule 
To examine compliance to the traditional Voodoo rule, which prohibits the use of the fine 
meshed konou at all times, we exploit variation in Voodoo adherence across and within villages 
in both the household survey and the fishery census sample. For the household survey sample 
we estimate the following equation: 
𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜆𝑎 +  𝛸𝑖
′𝛺 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑎        (1) 
𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable taking value 1 if individual i reports to have used the konou in 
week t (and 0 otherwise)9; 𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if individual i reports 
his religion to be Voodoo (and 0 otherwise); 𝜏𝑡 is a count variable that indicates the week of the 
survey period; 𝜆𝑎 are dummy variables at the arrondissement level that capture time-invariant 
community characteristics; 𝛸𝑖
′ is a vector of control variables; 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑎  denotes the random error 
term. To deal with serial correlation of the error terms we cluster error terms at the individual 
level, thereby allowing error terms to be correlated within individuals (across weeks) while still 
imposing independence of the error terms between individuals (Wooldridge, 2010).  
The time variable 𝜏𝑡  is included to capture unobserved time-varying environmental 
factors affecting the use of the konou, such as the growth cycle of shrimp. The 2009 household 
survey was implemented during the shrimp season (January-August). In this period, the quantity 
and size of shrimp in lake Nokoué gradually increase, which may affect a fisherman’s incentive 
to use the konou. Other environmental factors that typically change as the fishing season 
progresses are water characteristics such as salinity and transparency.  
                                                          
9 The time dimension is not essential for our hypothesis test in this case, as Voodoo is time-invariant. In section 
A.3.3. of the online appendix we explain why we use it for our baseline estimations. 
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The list of control variables 𝛸𝑖
′ contains the logarithms of age, years of education and 
annual income of the fisher, and the size and dependency ratio of his household. We control for 
age because installing and handling the konou requires considerable physical strength. Years 
of education are included to control for access to other income sources. Annual income captures 
wealth, and controls for the fact that the konou is an expensive instrument to purchase and 
maintain.10 Household size and the dependency ratio capture the need of fishers to use high-
yielding fishing instruments, to earn enough income or to bring home enough food.  
The variable of interest in Eq.(1) is Voodoo adherence. A significantly negative estimate 
for 𝛼1  would indicate that Voodoo fishermen use the konou less than other fishermen, on 
average. Assuming that we are adequately controlling for confounding factors, this result would 
suggest that Voodoo fishermen respect the traditional Voodoo rule more than other fishermen. 
An important confounding factor that is however not addressed in Eq.(1) is unobserved 
village-level heterogeneity. The estimate of 𝛼1 may be biased if, for instance, villages with a 
large share of Voodoo adherents are located in areas that are less suitable for the use of the 
konou. The household survey sample does not allow us to meaningfully control for village-
level heterogeneity because of the small sample size and proximity of the villages. We therefore 
make use of the larger 2006 fishery census sample (34 villages) to estimate the following 
equation: 
𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑖 =  𝛼0′ +  𝛼1′ 𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 + 𝜑𝑣 + Ф𝑖
′𝛶 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣      (2) 
𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑖 is an indicator variable taking value 1 if individual i reports to use the konou for fishing 
(and 0 otherwise); 𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 is as specified in Eq.(1); 𝜑𝑣 are village dummy variables; Ф𝑖
′ is a 
vector of control variables; 𝜀𝑖𝑣  denotes the random error term, in this case clustered at the 
                                                          
10 Controlling instead for the logarithm of the value of assets yields highly similar results. In any case, in our 
sample Voodoo fishers are on average richer than other fishers in terms of annual income and asset holdings.  
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village level to allow for within-village correlation of the error terms across individuals. The 
set of control variables Ф𝑖
′ consists of the logarithm of age, a categorical variable indicating the 
level of education, the number of children in the household11 and ethnicity dummy variables.12 
A significantly negative estimate of 𝛼1′ would indicate that any negative relation between 
Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou holds when accounting for unobserved village-
level heterogeneity. 
4.2. The fishing committee rule 
To identify compliance to the fishing committee rule, which prohibits the use of the konou in 
closed weeks and allows it in open weeks, we exploit the time dimension in the 2009 survey. 
We study the variation in the use of the konou across open and closed weeks in the subsample 
of konou users (i.e. fishers that used the konou at least once) by estimating the following 
equation: 
𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜆𝑎 + 𝛸𝑖
′𝛺 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑎      (3) 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡 is an indicator variable taking value 1 if the lake is closed in week t (and 0 otherwise); 
all other variables are as specified in Eq.(1). A significantly negative estimate for 𝛽1 would 
indicate that the use of the konou is on average lower in closed weeks compared to open weeks, 
suggesting compliance to the fishing committee rule.  
                                                          
11 Dependent children.  
12 The 2006 fishery census does not contain information on household size or income. We control for ethnicity 
because it is correlated with the use of fishing gear and religion. In the household survey sample ethnicity was 
omitted because all fishers belonged to the same ethnic group (Tofin). The ethnicities in the fishery census sample 
are reported in Table A.1 of the online appendix. 
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4.3. Compliance of traditional rule breakers to the fishing committee rule 
To examine how Voodoo fishers who break the traditional rule behave towards the fishing 
committee rule, we again look at the subsample of konou users. This subsample includes 
Voodoo adherents, who are thus breaking the traditional Voodoo-based rule, and fishers of 
other religions. We estimate an extended version of Eq.(3) that includes the indicator variable 
for Voodoo adherence and an interaction term between Voodoo adherence and the closing of 
the lake: 
𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  0 +  1𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 + 2𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 3𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜆𝑎 + 𝛸𝑖
′𝛺 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑎    (4) 
If Voodoo fishers who break the traditional rule also comply less to the fishing committee rule 
(compared to non-Voodoo fishers) the estimate of 
3
 should be significantly positive. That is, 
among konou users we should find that Voodoo adherents use the konou more in closed weeks 
than other fishers. 
4.4. Estimation technique 
Given that our dependent variable is binary, we could opt for a nonlinear limited dependent 
variable model such as a logit or probit model. Alternatively, we can estimate our equations by 
a linear model such as (linear) OLS, treating the categorical answer as if it were part of a 
continuous scale and assuming that the dependent variable is a linear function of the regressors. 
Linear models offer the advantage of straightforward interpretation, as the marginal effects are 
equal to the coefficient estimates (whereas in nonlinear models additional calculations are 
required to obtain marginal effects). Moreover, Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that OLS 
coefficient estimates for the regressor of interest will usually be close to the marginal effects 
obtained in a probit or logit model when the regressor is binary. For these reasons, we opt for 
linear models to estimate our baseline results and report probit estimates in the online appendix 
(section A.3.2). 
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To address concerns of unobserved individual heterogeneity confounding our results, 
we use an individual fixed effects model to estimate Eq.(3) and Eq.(4). However, this model 
does not allow us to estimate the impact of Voodoo adherence in Eq.(1) and Eq.(2). We 
therefore estimate these equations using an OLS model.13 
5. Results 
Table 4 presents the results on compliance with the traditional Voodoo-based rule. Columns (1) 
and (2) show coefficient estimates for Eq.(1), without and with controls. The estimate for 
Voodoo adherence is negative and statistically significant, indicating that on average Voodoo 
fishers use the konou less than other fishers. The probability of using the konou in any given 
week is on average 25 percent lower for Voodoo fishers compared to other fishers (all else 
equal).  
Columns (3) and (4) show coefficient estimates for Eq.(2), again without and with 
controls. The estimate for Voodoo adherence remains negative and statistically significant when 
village dummy variables are included. We therefore rule out the competing explanation that 
unobserved village-level heterogeneity is driving the negative relation between the use of the 
konou and Voodoo adherence. The absolute size of the coefficient is, however, substantially 
smaller in this specification: on average the probability of using the konou is 7 percent lower 
for Voodoo fishers compared to other fishers (all else equal).  
Table 5 presents the results for compliance with the fishing committee rule. Columns 
(1) and (2) show the results for Eq.(3), with and without controls, and column (3) shows the 
                                                          
13  The individual effects in a fixed effects model absorb all time-invariant variables such as Voodoo adherence. 
The Hausman-Taylor model (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) offers the possibility of estimating the impact of time-
invariant regressors in a fixed effects model, but requires instruments that were not available in our data. In section 
6.1. we use alternative methods to address the concern of unobserved individual heterogeneity for Eq.(1) and (2). 
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results for Eq.(4). The coefficient estimates for closed weeks are negative and statistically 
significant in all columns, indicating that konou users are on average 9 to 10 percent less likely 
to use the konou in closed weeks compared to open weeks (all else equal). This finding suggests 
that there is some, although limited, compliance to the fishing committee rule.  
The coefficient estimate for the interaction term is close to zero and not statistically 
significant. This result indicates that, among konou users, Voodoo adherents and other fishers 
are on average equally likely to use the konou in closed weeks. In other words, Voodoo fishers 
who decide to break the traditional rule (by using the konou) adopt the behaviour of non-
Voodoo fishers towards the fishing committee rule.  
To get an idea of the size of the estimated effects discussed above, we compare the 
impact of our regressor of interest to the impact of another important determinant of the konou: 
a fisherman’s age. To generate the same average negative effect on the probability of konou 
use as Voodoo adherence does in Eq. (1) (-25 percent), the age of the fisherman would have to 
increase by 150 percent, for instance from 30 to 90. Turning to Eq.(2), in which Voodoo 
adherence is estimated to reduce the probability of konou use by 7 percent, one would need a 
35 percent increase of the fisherman’s age, to have the same impact, for instance from the 
sample average of 37 to 50. In Eq.(3), the age of the fisherman would have to increase by 55 
percent – say from the survey sample average of 44 to 68 – to reduce the probability of konou 
use by the same extent as the closing of the lake does (about -14 percent).14 
The difference in effect size of 𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑖 between the survey (Eq.1) and census (Eq.2) 
could be due to the fact that Eq.(2) takes village-level confounding factors into account, but 
other explanations are possible. The census sample includes 28 additional villages, the 
dependent variables are measured differently and the identity of the interviewer may have 
                                                          
14 The marginal effect for the logarithm of age is -0.16 in Table 4, column (2) , -0.20 in  Table 4, column (4), and 
-0.24 in column (8) of Table A.10 (using probit estimates for Eq.(3)) (see online appendix). 
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mattered: fishers may have been less inclined to report konou use to census interviewers 
working for the government, with whom they have had many conflicts in the past about fishing 
activities (Dangbégnon, 2000)). 
We conduct a number of robustness checks. The results for Eq.(1), (3) and (4) are robust 
to the use of a larger unbalanced household survey sample of 121 fishers (not relevant for 
Eq.(2)), which includes fishers who were not interviewed in all weeks. The results for Eq.(1)-
(4) are robust to the use of a binary probit model. The results for Eq.(3) and (4) hold when 
estimated using an individual fixed effects probit model (not relevant for Eq.(1) and (2)). 
Finally, the results for Eq.(1) hold when we replace the time-varying dependent variable use of 
the konou in week t by a time-invariant measure of overall compliance: total use of the konou 
across 14 weeks. Details for these robustness checks and full results for all tables in this paper are 
provided in online appendix A. 
6. Competing explanations 
6.1. Unobserved individual heterogeneity 
In our analysis of compliance with the traditional rule we controlled for village-level 
unobservables, but not for individual-level unobservables. Our estimated relation between 
Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou may therefore result from unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. One specific concern relates to unobserved preferences for the traditional. 
Fishers with such a preference may reject both non-traditional religions (i.e. all religions other 
than Voodoo) and non-traditional fishing gear such as the konou.  
As explained in section 4.4 (footnote 13), the individual fixed effects model or 
Hausman-Taylor model, which control for unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, cannot 
be implemented in our case. We therefore turn to two alternative methods. 
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We start by addressing the specific concern that Voodoo adherents have a preference 
for the traditional. If this were the case, we would expect to find a negative relation between 
Voodoo adherence and other (relatively) recently introduced technologies as well. We test this 
by re-estimating Eq.(1) while replacing the dependent variable use of the konou by dummy 
variables indicating ownership of a mobile phone, electricity generator, radio and TV.15 The 
results, presented in Table 6., indicate that Voodoo fishers (or their households) are equally 
likely to own a mobile phone, electricity generator, radio or TV compared to other fishers. 16 
This finding suggests that Voodoo adherents do not to reject recently introduced technologies 
more than others. It therefore seems unlikely that Voodoo fishers would reject productive 
fishing innovations such as the konou solely because of a preference for the traditional.  
Aside from the specific concern of such unobserved preferences, there may be other 
unobserved characteristics related to Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou that confound 
our findings. We follow Oster (2013) and attempt to gauge the extent of the remaining omitted 
variable bias by looking at coefficient movements along with movements in R-squared values 
when control variables are included.  
Table 7 presents OLS estimation results for Eq.(1) when we consecutively control for 
the week variable, arrondissement dummies, the list of basic controls discussed in section 4.1 
and the following additional control variables: the fisherman’s relationship with the household 
head, his marital status, his number of wives, a dummy variable indicating whether he owns a 
mobile phone and three dummy variables indicating whether his household owns an electricity 
generator, radio or TV.   
                                                          
15 Except for the mobile phone, ownership of assets was recorded at the household level. However, 85 percent of 
sample fishers are head of the household and presumably have considerable decision making power regarding the 
purchasing of these items. 
16 Since we do not exploit the time dimension here, we can also use the larger unbalanced sample of fishers. The 
results are qualitatively the same, except that Voodoo adherents are significantly less likely to own a TV (see Table 
A.14 of the online appendix). 
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The results in Table 7 show that the size of the coefficient estimate for Voodoo 
adherence changes when arrondissement dummies are included – from -0.16 in column (2) to -
0.25 in column (3) – but remains quite stable afterwards. The R-squared value is 0.06 when 
arrondissement dummies are included and increases to 0.17 when all controls have been added, 
suggesting that the included controls are not uninformative. We can conclude from Table 7 that 
controlling for a variety of informative individual characteristics has a limited effect on the 
coefficient estimate for Voodoo adherence, making us quite confident that there are no major 
unobservables that would entirely knock out the effect. 
6.2. Reporting bias regarding the use of the konou 
A potential caveat is that fishers may lie about using the konou when the lake is closed. In this 
case we would overestimate compliance to the fishing committee rule. To verify whether there 
is reason for such concern, we examine the fluctuations of shrimp fishing revenue across open 
and closed weeks. As the konou is one of the most productive instruments used for shrimp 
fishing, any periodical variation in its use should be reflected in shrimp fishing revenue (when 
controlling for the use of other fishing gear).17 If fishers respect the fishing committee rule and 
abandon the konou in closed weeks, we should find that shrimp fishing revenue is lower in 
closed weeks compared to open weeks. Moreover, the abandonment of the konou in closed 
weeks may increase fishing yield when the lake is re-opened, thus giving an additional boost to 
fishing revenue.  
                                                          
17 We do not normalize fishing revenue by prices as prices are reported by local measures, which vary between 
villages, and greatly depend on the quality and size of shrimp. We therefore expect measurement error to be larger 
for recall data on prices than for recall data on nominal fishing revenue. Moreover, as most catches are sold within 
the same day, weekly fishing revenue should be strongly correlated with weekly catches. Finally, any price rise 
that follows from the closing of the lake will attenuate our estimates, reducing the risk of obtaining false positive 
results.  
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One possible objection is that self-reported data on fishing revenue might also suffer 
from reporting bias. We cannot completely rule out this possibility, but we do expect reporting 
bias in fishing revenue data to be much less severe. Weekly fishing revenue is reported by 
species, not by fishing instrument. As there are other high-yielding shrimp fishing instruments 
apart from the konou, such as shrimp pots, fishers can explain high shrimp fishing revenue in 
closed weeks by intensive use of these alternative, non-prohibited fishing instruments. We 
therefore believe that fishermen had little incentive to lie about shrimp fishing revenue in closed 
weeks. 
Figure 3 depicts the fluctuation of average weekly shrimp fishing revenue across open 
and closed weeks. The graph supports our hypothesis, showing that average fishing revenue 
generally drops in closed weeks compared to open weeks. The graph further shows a rise of 
fishing revenue in week 10 – a closed week – which indicates that fishers were not hesitant to 
report increases in fishing revenue when the lake was closed. We also note a boost in revenues 
once the lake is opened again, which can certainly not be attributed to conscious misreporting 
by fishermen.  
To examine the weekly fluctuations of shrimp fishing revenue more formally, we use 
an individual fixed effects model to estimate two equations. In the first equation we include 
indicator variables for each closed week, taking the open period as the baseline category. In the 
second equation we include indicator variables for each of the open weeks, taking the closed 
period as the baseline category. The two equations can be written as follows: 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝜔0 +  𝜔1𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡
1 +  𝜔2𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡
2 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + К′𝑖𝑡 𝛩+𝜀𝑖𝑡     (5) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝜔′0 + 𝜔3𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡
1 + 𝜔4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡
2 + 𝜔5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡
3 + 𝜔6𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡
4 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + К
′
𝑖𝑡 𝛩 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (6) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 denotes average weekly shrimp fishing revenue for fisherman i in week t; 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡
𝑤  (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑤) 
are indicator variables that take value 1 if the lake is closed (open) in week t for the w-th 
consecutive week (and 0 otherwise); 𝜏𝑡  is a count variable as specified in Eq.(1); 𝜑𝑖  are 
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individual fixed effects (i.e. individual-level dummy variables); К′𝑖𝑡  is a vector of control 
variables; 𝜀𝑖𝑡  denotes the random error term clustered at the individual level. The control 
variables in К′𝑖𝑡  reflect the fishery production function and capture the input of time, labour and 
capital. We include the logarithms of the number of fishing days and the number of persons 
fishing, and dummy variables indicating the use of the three main shrimp fishing instruments 
other than the konou. 
Table 8 presents estimation results for Eq.(5) in columns (1) and (2). The coefficient 
estimate for the first week of closing is negative, large and statistically significant. The findings 
indicate that, all else equal, shrimp fishing revenue is on average 78 percent lower in the first 
week of closing compared to the average of open weeks. In contrast, the coefficient estimate 
for the second week of closing is small and not statistically significant. This finding may be 
explained by two mechanisms. First, in the second closed week fishermen may already start to 
benefit from less intensive konou use in the previous week through a higher yield for other 
fishing gear. Second, fishermen may resume their konou use already in the second closed week 
to reap the benefits of the restraint exercised by other konou users.  
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 8 show estimation results for Eq.(6). The coefficient 
estimates for the first and second week of opening are positive, large and statistically 
significant. The results indicate that shrimp fishing revenue is on average 117 percent higher in 
the first open week and 67 percent higher in the second open week, compared to the average of 
closed weeks. The coefficient estimates for the third and fourth open weeks are positive but not 
statistically significant. These findings suggest that there is a strong increase in fishing revenue 
in the first two open weeks, which dies out in the third and fourth weeks of opening. One 
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possible explanation is that intensive use of the konou in the first two open weeks reduces 
fishing yield again, driving down fishing revenue in the two weeks after.18 
These findings are a strong indication of reductions in konou use when the lake is closed 
However, one may still object that the fluctuations in fishing revenue are caused by a natural 
cycle rather the fishing committee rule. We therefore perform a falsification test, comparing the 
fluctuations in shrimp revenue at Nokoué with those at another southern lake in Benin (Ahémé, 
see Figure 1), where similar natural conditions prevail but the fishing committee rule does not 
apply. Finding no significant differences between the two lakes would suggest that the 
fluctuations observed at Nokoué are caused by a natural cycle rather than the fishing committee 
rule. However, we find significantly larger fluctuations of shrimp revenue at Nokoué, 
suggesting that the observed fluctuations do not merely result from natural cyclicality (see the 
online appendix for more details).  
                                                          
18 The average estimated jump in fishing revenue in the first open week is larger than the average estimated drop 
in fishing revenue in the first closed week. A possible explanation is that the rise in fishing revenue in open weeks 
is also driven by an increase in overall fishing yield, and not merely the result of fishers resuming the use of the 
konou.  
 23 
 
7. Conclusion 
The lake fisheries of southern Benin provide a textbook example of the tragedy of the commons. 
Overfishing has compromised the sustainability of the fishery stock, which has dramatically 
declined in the last decades (Clédjo, 2006; FAO, 2008). 
Fishing activities at lake Nokoué – the largest lake in Benin – are regulated by two fishery 
management institutions, one embedded in the traditional Voodoo religion and one recent secular 
institution in the form of fishing committees. We have attempted to shed light on the effectiveness 
of each of these institutions. In addition, we have examined how Voodoo fishers who break with 
traditional Voodoo-based rules behave towards the recent fishing committee institution.  
Regarding the traditional Voodoo-based institution, we have found a statistically significant 
negative relation between the use of the konou and Voodoo adherence, suggesting that Voodoo 
adherents respect the traditional fine mesh nets taboo more than others. This result remains, 
although it becomes weaker, when we take unobserved village-level heterogeneity into account. 
The relation is also robust to the use of different samples and model specifications.  
In addition, we have addressed the competing explanation of an unobserved preference for 
the traditional, by showing that Voodoo adherents adopt other recently introduced technologies 
(e.g. the mobile phone and radio) to the same extent as other fishers. We have also shown that the 
inclusion of a variety of informative individual characteristics has little effect on the coefficient 
estimate for Voodoo adherence, thereby mitigating the concern that our results are driven by 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Although we cannot completely rule out omitted variable 
bias, the results suggest that it is unlikely that such bias can entirely knock out the effect of Voodoo 
adherence.  
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Regarding the fishing committee institution, we have found evidence for a statistically 
significant impact of the opening-closing rule on the use of the konou. However, quantitatively the 
impact is small. One possible explanation for the observed compliance is that collectively halting 
konou use for some weeks raises fishing yield in the following weeks, incentivizing konou users 
to respect the rule. The limited quantitative effect is likely explained by insufficient monitoring 
and corruption, which create incentives to free ride on the compliance of others.  
One concern regarding these findings is that fishermen may lie about konou use in closed 
weeks. We have therefore studied the fluctuations of fishing revenue for shrimp – strongly 
correlated with konou use – across open and closed weeks. This analysis corroborates our findings 
regarding the fishing committee rule. Although we cannot completely rule out the possibility of 
fishermen also lying about fishing revenue, we have argued that it is unlikely that revenue data 
suffer from an equally severe reporting bias, reducing the concern that such bias is driving our 
findings on compliance with the fishing committee rule.  
We have further found that Voodoo adherents who break the traditional rule comply to the 
fishing committee rule in the same way as other fishers. If it were the case that Voodoo rule 
breakers simply display free rider behaviour, we might expect these fishers to free ride on other 
fishing rules as well, and more so than other fishers. Our results instead suggest that Voodoo fishers 
who decide to abandon the (strict) traditional rule may still see the need to exercise some collective 
restraint and shift towards the fishing committee rule. 
Our empirical findings confirm qualitative evidence on the continued role of the traditional 
Voodoo institution in regulating fishing activities at the southern lakes of Benin (Amoussou, 2004; 
Clédjo, 2006; République du Bénin, 2008). Our findings also resonate with those of several other 
studies (see introduction) and with recent research advocating an integrated resource management 
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approach, where traditional institutions are combined with contemporary management institutions 
and technologies (Becker and Ghimire, 2003; Cinner and Aswani, 2007; Colding and Folke, 2001; 
Drew, 2005: Dudley et al., 2009). 
At the same time, the above analysis is only a first step towards a quantitative assessment 
of the effectiveness and potential substitutability of these institutions. More research is needed to 
fully understand how these institutions and their interaction affect fishing behaviour, and what the 
policy implications are. Our first analysis suggests that both institutions affect fishing behaviour, 
but only in a limited way. In this case resource management needs to be strengthened. One 
integrated management strategy that is increasingly being implemented is the incorporation of 
sacred sites into official protected areas. Sacred forests in Benin are already being integrated into 
a national system of protected areas (GEF, 2010). Although the southern lakes of Benin are 
similarly characterized by sacred sites, the official protection of sacred sites also involves risks 
such as a loss of spiritual value (Dudley et al., 2009). Hence, careful research is needed to evaluate 
the potential success of this strategy. Future research could further examine whether other elements 
of the traditional Voodoo institution (such as the prohibition to fish on days of worship) can be 
valuably integrated into modern management institutions, or whether other religions can play a role 
in natural resource management.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Location of the southern lakes and the 2009 household survey area in Benin  
 
 
Lake Ahémé 
Lake Nokoué 
 
Cotonou 
Porto Novo 
So-Ava 
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Figure 2: Share of fishers using the konou in each week, across open and closed weeks 
 
 
   
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Notes: Light-grey areas indicate closed weeks. Konou users are fishers who report to have used the 
konou at least once during the survey period. 
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Figure 3: Average weekly shrimp fishing revenue across open and closed weeks  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Notes: Light-grey areas indicate closed weeks. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equalled 
about 656 CFA in 2009. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of data samples used 
Characteristic 
Fishery 
census  
Household 
survey  
Household survey - 
konou users 
Perception 
survey  
Year 2006 2009 2009 2013 
Arrondissements 10 2 2 1 
Villages 34 6 5 3 
Individuals 5,852 103 47 137 
Weeks / 14 14 / 
Observations 5,852 1,442 658 137 
Source: Author's calculations. Notes: konou users are defined as fishers who report to have used the konou at 
least once during the survey period. 
 
Table 2: Religious affiliation of fishers in two samples 
 Fishery census (2006) Household survey (2009) 
Religion Share (%) Obs Share (%) Obs 
Catholicism 22.5 1,317 27.2 28 
Protestantism 12.9 757 11.7 12 
Islam 3.3 192 0 0 
Voodoo 23.5 1,375 27.2 28 
Christianisme Céleste 19.0 1,114 22.3 23 
Other 8.7 510 4.9 5 
None 10.0 587 6.8 7 
Total 100 5,852 100 103 
Source: Author’s calculations.       
 
Table 3: Share of konou users by religious adherence in two samples 
 
Fishery census (2006) 
 
Household survey (2009) 
Religion Konou users (%) Obs. N   Konou users (%) Obs. N 
Voodoo 19.6 269 1,375   28.6 8 28 
Other 34.2 1,530 4,477   52.0 39 75 
Overall 30.7 1,799 5,852   45.6 47 103 
Source: Author's calculations. Notes: Konou users are fishers who use the konou. In the household survey, we 
define a konou user as a fisher who reports to have used the konou at least once. 
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Table 4: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence in two samples 
Sample Household survey Fishery census 
Dependent variable Use of the konou in week t Use of the konou 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Voodoo -0.151** -0.252*** -0.146*** -0.066* 
 (0.059) (0.090) (0.050) (0.034) 
     
Week No Yes No No 
Arrondissement No Yes No No 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Village  No No No Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of clusters 102 88 34 34 
Observations 1,190 1,039 5,852 5,162 
R-squared 0.025 0.125 0.018 0.267 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the individual 
level for columns (1) and (2) and at the village level for columns (3) and (4). ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Week refers to a count variable that indicates the week of observation. 
Arrondissement refers to dummy variables indicating the arrondissement in which the individual lives. Village 
refers to dummy variables indicating the village in which the individual lives. Controls refer to the control variables 
discussed in section 4.1.  
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Table 5: Fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou and the fishing committee rule 
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Closed -0.109*** -0.090*** -0.095*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) 
Voodoo*Closed   0.035 
   (0.059) 
    
Week No Yes Yes 
Arrondissement Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
    
Number of clusters 47 47 47 
Observations 577 577 577 
Within R-squared 0.014 0.079 0.079 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Columns (1) and (2) show estimation results for Eq.(3). Column 
(3) shows estimation results for Eq.(4). The regression sample is limited to the subsample of konou users, i.e. fishers 
who report to have used the konou at least once during the survey period. The estimates for time-invariant regressors, 
including Voodoo adherence, are omitted in this model. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to 
the notes below Table 4. 
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Table 6: OLS estimation results: Ownership of recent technologies and Voodoo adherence 
(2009 household survey) 
Dependent 
variable 
Individual owns 
mobile phone 
Household owns 
electricity generator 
Household 
owns radio 
Household owns 
television 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Voodoo -0.184 0.168 0.084 -0.006 
  (0.164) (0.133) (0.195) (0.084) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondissement Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.135 0.123 0.073 0.119 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. For details on the explanatory variables we refer to the 
notes below Table 4. Controls are listed in section 4.1. 
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Table 7: OLS estimation results: Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou - inclusion of series of control variables (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Voodoo -0.151** -0.157*** -0.245*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.238** -0.233** -0.209* -0.201* -0.201* 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.086) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.107) (0.116) (0.113) (0.114) 
Week           
Arrondissement           
Basic controls           
Relationship household 
head 
          
Marital status           
Number of wives           
Mobile phone           
Electricity generator           
Radio           
TV           
Constant           
            
Number of clusters 102 102 102 88 88 88 88 79 79 79 79 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 927 927 927 927 
R-squared 0.025 0.041 0.059 0.125 0.138 0.138 0.141 0.160 0.164 0.169 0.169 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Basic controls refer to the list of control variables discussed in section 4.1. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes 
below Table 4. 
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Table 8: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Shrimp fishing revenue across weeks  
(2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Closed first week -1.186*** -0.783***   
 (0.277) (0.253)   
Closed second week -0.505** -0.094   
 (0.233) (0.221)   
Open first week   1.513*** 1.169*** 
   (0.305) (0.280) 
Open second week   1.179*** 0.670** 
   (0.346) (0.311) 
Open third week   0.990*** 0.375 
   (0.347) (0.319) 
Open fourth week   0.632** 0.228 
   (0.245) (0.243) 
Week No Yes No Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of clusters 103 102 103 102 
Observations 1,438 1,184 1,438 1,184 
R-squared 0.016 0.255 0.022 0.260 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro 
equaled about 656 CFA in 2009. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below 
Table 4. 
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Online Appendix to the Paper ‘Voodoo versus fishing committees: the role of 
traditional and contemporary institutions in fisheries management’ 
 
Appendix A reports summary statistics, full results and a detailed discussion of the robustness 
checks. Appendix B provides additional information on data collection. We explain the 
implementation of the 2009 household survey in detail, discuss variable measurement and 
present the questions asked in the household survey and fishery census. Appendix C provides a 
more detailed description of the history of Voodoo and fisheries management, which was 
summarized in the introduction of the paper. 
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A. Summary statistics and full results 
A.1. Summary statistics 
Table A.1: Summary statistics of individual and household characteristics  
Panel A: Household survey sample (2009) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Max. N 
Age 44.25 13.73 90 97 
Years of education 0.67 2.02 12 103 
Annual income 1,810,613 1,446,688 7,850,000 102 
Annual income from fishery sector 1,557,422 1,341,902 7,850,000 102 
Household size 6.76 4.09 22 95 
Dependency ratio 0.83 0.75 4 90 
Number of fishing days 4.37 2.15 7 1,442 
Number of persons fishing 1.73 0.73 8 1,201 
Panel B: Fishery census sample (2006) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Max. N 
Age 37 13.06 80 5,803 
Number of dependent children 4.7 2.80 15 5,187 
Share with formal education 16.5     5,852 
Share Goun ethnicity 2.0     5,852 
Share Aizo ethnicity 4.0     5,852 
Share Tofin ethnicity 83.3     5,852 
Share Xwla ethnicity 9.6     5,852 
Share Wémè ethnicity 0.2   5,852 
Share Sèto ethnicity 0.7   5,852 
Share Adja ethnicity 0.2   5,852 
Share Sahouè ethnicity 0.2   5,852 
Source: Author’s calculations. Notes: Earnings are expressed in CFA. One euro equaled about 656 CFA in 2009. 
The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of dependent members (dependent children and seniors of 60 years 
and older) over active members of the household.  
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A.2 Full tables for main results 
 
Table A.2: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Voodoo -0.151** -0.157*** -0.245*** -0.233** -0.232** -0.260*** -0.259*** -0.252*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.086) (0.096) (0.096) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090) 
Week  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
(log) Age    -0.131 -0.132 -0.142* -0.159 -0.161 
    (0.091) (0.091) (0.084) (0.098) (0.098) 
(log) Years of education     -0.006 -0.011 -0.026 -0.023 
     (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) 
(log) Annual income      0.153*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 
      (0.049) (0.054) (0.053) 
Household size       0.015 0.016 
       (0.011) (0.012) 
Dependency ratio        -0.028 
        (0.053) 
Arrondissement No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.268*** 0.160*** 0.272*** 0.750** 0.758** -1.445* -1.442* -1.406 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.076) (0.352) (0.354) (0.799) (0.849) (0.849) 
         
Number of clusters 102 102 102 97 97 97 89 88 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,053 1,039 
R-squared 0.025 0.041 0.059 0.066 0.066 0.110 0.121 0.125 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Annual income is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 656 CFA in 2009. Week refers to a count variable that indicates the survey week. 
Arrondissement refers to dummy variables indicating the arrondissement in which the individual lives.  
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Table A.3: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2006 fishery census) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou by fisher i 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Voodoo -0.146*** -0.067** -0.067** -0.069* -0.066* 
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) 
(log) Age  -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.200*** -0.197*** 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.050) 
Level of education   -0.004 0.000 0.004 
   (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Number of children    0.004 0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Ethnicity No No No No Yes 
      
Village No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.342*** 0.687*** 0.696*** 0.787*** 0.809*** 
 (0.046) (0.153) (0.153) (0.181) (0.183) 
      
Number of clusters 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 5,852 5,824 5,824 5,162 5,162 
R-squared 0.018 0.261 0.261 0.263 0.267 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Village refers to dummy variables indicating the village in which the individual lives. Ethnicity refers to ethnicity dummies indicating to which 
ethnicity the fisherman belongs. 
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Table A.4 : Individual fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks 
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
     
Closed -0.109*** -0.090*** -0.095*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) 
Week  0.028*** 0.028*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Voodoo*Closed  0.035 
   (0.059) 
Constant 0.509*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 
 (0.009) (0.072) (0.072) 
    
Number of clusters 47 47 47 
Observations 577 577 577 
Within R-squared 0.014 0.079 0.079 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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A.3. Detailed exposition of robustness checks 
A.3.1. Alternative sample 
Our baseline analysis of the 2009 household survey data relied on a balanced sample of fishers, 
i.e. fishers who were visited in all 14 weeks. This choice was motivated by the fact that the timing 
of missing weeks may be related to the use of the konou and the fishing committee rule. For 
instance, fishers who were violating the fishing committee rule by using the konou in closed weeks 
may have avoided to be interviewed in those weeks. It is also possible that fishers who generally 
comply to the fishing committee rule take up alternative economic activities in closed weeks to 
compensate for the inability to use the konou.  
 We verify whether our results hold when we re-estimate Eq.(1), (3) and (4) using an 
unbalanced sample of fishers, including fishers who were not interviewed in one or more weeks.1 
The unbalanced sample includes 121 fishers. We extend Eq.(1) with the regressor Missing weeksi 
which counts the number of weeks in which the fisher was not interviewed. The OLS estimation 
results for Eq.(1) are reported in Table A.5; the individual fixed effects estimation results for Eq.(3) 
and Eq.(4) are reported in Table A.6. The results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively 
similar to our baseline results. 
A.3.2. Alternative estimation model 
We check whether we obtain the same results using nonlinear estimations models. We start by re-
estimating Eq.(1)-(4) using a probit model. The results are presented in Tables A.7-A.10  and are 
highly similar to the results obtained using linear estimation models. In contrast to the individual 
fixed effects model used for the baseline estimation of Eq.(4), the probit model allows us to 
estimate the coefficient for Voodoo adherence (a time-invariant variable). Table A.10 presents the 
                                                          
1 As there is no time dimension in the census data, this test is not relevant for Eq.(2). 
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probit estimation results for Eq.(4). The marginal effect for Voodoo adherence has a negative sign 
but is not statistically significantly different from zero. This finding might at first appear to 
contradict our earlier results regarding the relation between Voodoo adherence and the use of the 
konou (Table A.2). However, these earlier results applied for the full sample of fishers, which 
includes konou users and fishers who do not use the konou at all. In contrast, the results presented 
in Table A.10 hold only for the subsample of konou users. Among these konou users are Voodoo 
fishers who have decided to break the traditional rule. Hence, the insignificant result for Voodoo 
adherence in Table A.10 indicates that Voodoo fishers, once they have decided to break the 
traditional rule, are on average equally likely to use the konou in any given week as other konou 
users (all else equal). 
We further re-estimate Eq.(3) and (4) using a probit individual fixed effects model (by 
adding 47 individual dummy variables as regressors).2 The results for Eq.(3) and (4), presented in 
Table A.11, are again quantitatively similar to the main results for Eq.(3) and (4) (cfr. Table A.4). 
A.3.3. Alternative dependent variable 
We verify whether our results for Eq.(1) hold when we use an alternative definition of compliance 
to the traditional rule. So far we have used a time-varying dependent variable, i.e. the use of the 
konou across weeks. This choice is motivated by the fact that the decision to use the konou depends 
in part on unobserved time-varying variables such as the growth cycle of shrimp or local conditions 
on the lake (e.g. salinity of the water). Looking at the variation in the use of the konou across 
weeks allows us to control for these unobserved weekly-varying variables and produce a more 
precise coefficient estimate for Voodoo adherence. 
                                                          
2 As explained before, we do not apply this robustness check to Eq.(1) and (2) since our variable of interest is time-
invariant. 
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Nevertheless, since our regressor of interest – Voodoo adherence – does not vary over time, 
we can construct a time-invariant measure of overall compliance to the traditional rule. More 
specifically, we take the simple sum of the number of weeks the konou was used by fisherman i 
across the observation period of 14 weeks. In Eq.(1), we replace the binary dependent variable use 
of the konou in week t by the aggregated variable total use of the konou by individual i. We estimate 
this adjusted equation using OLS. We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors rather than 
clustered standard errors, as we no longer exploit the time dimension of the data and serial 
correlation of the error terms is not a concern.  
The results are reported in Table A.12 and indicate that a Voodoo fisherman on average 
uses the konou 2.9 weeks less than a fisherman who follows another religion (all else equal). 
Sample fishermen who are not Voodoo adherents used the konou on average in 3.2 weeks (with a 
standard deviation of 3.6 weeks) in total. Hence, the average estimated impact of Voodoo 
adherence on total konou use amounts to 90 % of the sample average of total konou use among 
non-Voodoo fishers.
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Table A.5: OLS estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence – unbalanced sample (2009 household survey ) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Voodoo -0.103* -0.109* -0.165** -0.154** -0.154** -0.166** -0.162** -0.160** -0.173** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) 
Week  0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
(log) Age    -0.109 -0.106 -0.123 -0.139 -0.140 -0.119 
    (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) 
(log) Years of Education     0.015 0.011 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
     (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) 
(log) Annual income      0.048** 0.045** 0.045** 0.064** 
      (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) 
Household size       0.012 0.013 0.011 
       (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Dependency ratio        -0.010 -0.004 
        (0.046) (0.044) 
Missing weeks         0.032** 
         (0.014) 
Arrondissement No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Constant 0.282*** 0.187*** 0.260*** 0.654** 0.639** 0.009 0.033 0.034 -0.335 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.063) (0.297) (0.297) (0.376) (0.371) (0.371) (0.433) 
          
Number of clusters 158 158 158 152 152 148 137 136 136 
Observations 1,555 1,555 1,555 1,485 1,485 1,465 1,374 1,360 1,360 
R-squared 0.011 0.023 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.051 0.060 0.061 0.076 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. The regressor Missing weeks counts the number of weeks for which information is missing for individual i. For more details on the explanatory 
variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2.  
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Table A.6: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks - unbalanced 
sample  
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
Closed -0.133*** -0.115*** -0.107*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) 
Week  0.023*** 0.023*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
Voodoo*Closed  -0.041 
   (0.071) 
Constant 0.541*** 0.341*** 0.341*** 
 (0.009) (0.064) (0.064) 
    
Number of clusters 76 76 76 
Observations 789 789 789 
Within R-squared 0.020 0.062 0.063 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the 
notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.7: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t             
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8)  
Marginal 
effects 
          
Voodoo -0.571** -0.847** -0.780** -0.778** -0.925*** -0.878*** -0.851*** -0.216*** 
 (0.262) (0.331) (0.345) (0.346) (0.327) (0.332) (0.326) (0.064) 
Week  0.045*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.017*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) 
(log) Age   -0.463 -0.470 -0.525* -0.558* -0.558* -0.171* 
   (0.303) (0.305) (0.290) (0.326) (0.325) (0.101) 
(log) Years of education    -0.025 -0.042 -0.093 -0.085 -0.026 
    (0.161) (0.162) (0.173) (0.175) (0.053) 
(log) Annual income     0.528*** 0.495*** 0.494*** 0.151*** 
     (0.177) (0.179) (0.176) (0.053) 
Household size      0.046 0.051 0.016 
      (0.035) (0.036) (0.011) 
Dependency ratio       -0.091 -0.028 
       (0.188) (0.058) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.618*** -0.678*** 1.014 1.046 -6.507** -6.208** -6.181**  
 (0.105) (0.228) (1.177) (1.185) (2.860) (2.891) (2.859)  
         
Number of clusters 102 102 97 97 97 89 88 88 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,124 1,124 1,124 1,053 1,039 1,039 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (8) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (7). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A2. 
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Table A.8: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2006 fishery census) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou by fisher i  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(7)  
Marginal effects 
        
Voodoo -0.450*** -0.381*** -0.254* -0.256* -0.255* -0.236* -0.067* 
 (0.156) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.143) (0.140) (0.037) 
(log) Age   -0.631*** -0.633*** -0.730*** -0.730*** -0.217*** 
   (0.155) (0.155) (0.187) (0.189) (0.055) 
Literacy    -0.017 -0.003 0.016 0.005 
    (0.044) (0.046) (0.058) (0.017) 
Number of children     0.019 0.018 0.005 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) 
        
Village No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -0.408*** -2.088*** 0.104 0.135 0.606 0.742  
 (0.125) (0.036) (0.536) (0.541) (0.665) (0.776)  
        
Number of clusters 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 5,852 5,852 5,824 5,824 5,162 5,160 5,160 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (7) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (6). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.9: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks (2009 household survey – subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8)  
Marginal 
effects 
          
Closed -0.340*** -0.312*** -0.308*** -0.309*** -0.310*** -0.305*** -0.334*** -0.133*** 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.085) (0.034) 
Week  0.069*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.032*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) 
(log) Age   -0.377 -0.384 -0.388 -0.692** -0.693** -0.277** 
   (0.340) (0.347) (0.342) (0.294) (0.296) (0.118) 
(log) Years of education    -0.030 -0.032 0.022 0.022 0.009 
    (0.196) (0.197) (0.160) (0.155) (0.062) 
(log) Annual income     -0.027 0.131 0.132 0.053 
     (0.129) (0.143) (0.141) (0.056) 
Household size      0.100*** 0.101*** 0.040*** 
      (0.036) (0.036) (0.014) 
Dependency ratio       -0.006 -0.002 
       (0.167) (0.067) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.042 -0.230 1.148 1.182 1.611 -0.603 -0.622  
 (0.101) (0.210) (1.332) (1.366) (2.091) (2.300) (2.324)  
         
Number of clusters 47 47 46 46 46 46 45 45 
Observations 577 577 563 563 563 563 549 549 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (8) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (7). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.10: Probit estimation results: Use of the konou by Voodoo fishers in closed weeks (2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8)  
Marginal 
effects 
          
Voodoo -0.260 -0.514 -0.496 -0.495 -0.508 -0.401 -0.422 -0.168 
 (0.336) (0.372) (0.382) (0.383) (0.383) (0.292) (0.305) (0.121) 
Closed -0.332*** -0.305*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.311*** -0.348*** -0.139*** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.038) 
Voodoo*Closed -0.089 -0.135 -0.131 -0.130 -0.132 -0.005 0.026 0.019 
 (0.237) (0.279) (0.283) (0.284) (0.284) (0.208) (0.208) (0.073) 
Week  0.070*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.032*** 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) 
(log) Age   -0.307 -0.309 -0.302 -0.595** -0.593** -0.236** 
   (0.319) (0.322) (0.316) (0.297) (0.300) (0.120) 
Literacy    -0.010 -0.007 0.034 0.037 0.015 
    (0.170) (0.171) (0.150) (0.147) (0.059) 
(log) Annual income     0.043 0.161 0.170 0.068 
     (0.118) (0.141) (0.138) (0.055) 
Household size      0.090** 0.092** 0.037** 
      (0.037) (0.036) (0.014) 
Dependency ratio       -0.039 -0.016 
       (0.170) (0.068) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.085 -0.049 1.064 1.076 0.407 -1.190 -1.322  
 (0.103) (0.201) (1.204) (1.217) (1.938) (2.256) (2.267)  
         
         
Number of clusters 47 47 46 46 46 46 45 45 
Observations 577 577 563 563 563 563 549 549 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. Column (8) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (7). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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Table A.11: Probit individual fixed effects estimation results: Use of the konou in closed weeks 
(2009 household survey - subsample of konou users) 
Dependent variable: Use of the konou in week t  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
(4)  
Marginal effects 
     
Closed -0.352*** -0.308*** -0.311*** -0.122*** 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.105) (0.041) 
Week  0.092*** 0.092*** 0.036*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) 
Voodoo*Closed   0.029 0.017 
   (0.250) (0.074) 
Constant 0.678*** 0.050 0.051  
 (0.030) (0.192) (0.194)  
     
Number of clusters 43 43 43 43 
Observations 550 550 550 549 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively.  Column (4) presents average marginal effects calculated at the mean values of other variables for the specification in column (3). For more details 
on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2.  
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Table A.12: OLS estimation results: Total use of the konou and Voodoo adherence (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable Total number of weeks fisherman i used the konou    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Voodoo -1.874*** -2.749*** -2.529** -2.522** -2.809*** -3.002*** -2.884*** 
 (0.668) (0.991) (1.081) (1.089) (0.964) (1.083) (1.086) 
(log) Age   -1.954* -1.980* -2.146** -1.908 -1.935 
   (1.075) (1.089) (1.012) (1.212) (1.217) 
(log) Years of education    -0.101 -0.211 -0.354 -0.311 
    (0.540) (0.536) (0.566) (0.575) 
(log) Annual wage     1.784*** 1.722** 1.694** 
     (0.640) (0.738) (0.739) 
Household size      0.090 0.113 
      (0.136) (0.149) 
Dependency Ratio       -0.443 
       (0.598) 
Arrondissement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant 3.160*** 4.238*** 11.552*** 11.675*** -13.614 -13.860 -13.230 
 (0.416) (0.914) (4.209) (4.279) (10.235) (11.660) (11.723) 
        
Observations 103 103 97 97 97 89 88 
R-squared 0.058 0.086 0.107 0.107 0.192 0.194 0.199 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels 
respectively. For more details on the explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2. 
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A.4. Full tables for analysis in section 6 (competing explanations) 
A.4.1. Unobserved individual heterogeneity 
 
Table A.13: OLS estimation results: Ownership of recent technologies and Voodoo adherence 
(2009 household survey - balanced sample) 
Dependent variable 
Individual owns 
mobile phone 
Household owns 
electricity generator 
Household 
owns radio 
Household owns 
television 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Voodoo -0.184 0.168 0.084 -0.006 
  (0.164) (0.133) (0.195) (0.084) 
(log) Age -0.115 -0.077 -0.327* -0.107 
  (0.197) (0.152) (0.167) (0.138) 
(log) Years of 
education 
-0.069 -0.081* -0.039 0.021 
  (0.086) (0.046) (0.083) (0.067) 
(log) Annual wage 0.134 -0.121* 0.016 -0.097* 
  (0.093) (0.063) (0.092) (0.058) 
Household size 0.016 0.032** -0.001 0.027* 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
Dependency Ratio 0.072 -0.076 0.044 -0.035 
  (0.093) (0.082) (0.083) (0.075) 
Arrondissement -0.192 -0.026 0.179 -0.020 
  (0.170) (0.129) (0.174) (0.102) 
Constant -0.883 2.018* 1.532 1.744 
  (1.517) (1.153) (1.482) (1.067) 
          
Observations 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.135 0.123 0.073 0.119 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Controls are discussed in section 4.1. of the paper. 
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Table A.14: OLS estimation results: Ownership of new technologies and Voodoo adherence 
(2009 household survey – unbalanced sample) 
Dependent variable 
Individual owns 
mobile phone 
Household owns 
electricity generator 
Household 
owns radio 
Household 
owns television 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Voodoo -0.076 -0.136 0.043 -0.191** 
  (0.100) (0.108) (0.123) (0.076) 
(log) Age -0.108 -0.074 -0.243** -0.116 
  (0.118) (0.108) (0.097) (0.099) 
(log) Years of 
education 
-0.054 -0.011 0.010 0.048 
  (0.069) (0.057) (0.061) (0.060) 
(log) Annual wage -0.002 0.016*** 0.051*** 0.013** 
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Household size 0.016* 0.024** 0.005 0.022** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Dependency Ratio 0.006 -0.046 -0.020 -0.015 
  (0.059) (0.069) (0.062) (0.064) 
Arrondissement -0.289*** -0.015 0.136 0.013 
  (0.096) (0.100) (0.115) (0.081) 
Constant 1.140** 0.176 0.807** 0.305 
  (0.495) (0.389) (0.383) (0.357) 
          
Observations 121 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.122 0.089 0.116 0.133 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Controls are discussed in section 4.1. of the 
paper. 
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Table A.15: OLS estimation results: Voodoo adherence and the use of the konou - inclusion of control variables (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable Use of the konou in week t 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Voodoo -0.151** -0.157*** -0.245*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.238** -0.233** -0.209* -0.201* -0.201* 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.086) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.107) (0.116) (0.113) (0.114) 
            
(log) Age    -0.161 -0.217** -0.215** -0.215** -0.145 -0.145 -0.170 -0.170 
    (0.098) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.100) (0.097) (0.104) (0.104) 
(log) Years of education    -0.023 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.023 -0.028 -0.030 -0.030 
    (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) 
(log) Annual income    0.149*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.140** 0.126** 0.131** 0.131** 
    (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) 
Household size    0.016 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.019 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Dependency ratio    -0.028 -0.048 -0.047 -0.054 -0.034 -0.047 -0.045 -0.046 
    (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
Relationship household head 
    -0.050** -0.052** -0.056*** -0.043* -0.045* -0.046* -0.046* 
    (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Marital status      -0.027 -0.052 -0.019 -0.046 -0.061 -0.063 
      (0.123) (0.127) (0.146) (0.144) (0.150) (0.149) 
Number of wives       0.040 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.044 
       (0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060) 
Mobile phone        0.107* 0.134* 0.132* 0.132* 
        (0.064) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077) 
Electricity generator         -0.086 -0.077 -0.074 
         (0.112) (0.114) (0.136) 
Radio          -0.074 -0.074 
          (0.066) (0.066) 
TV           -0.006 
           (0.134) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arrondissement No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Number of clusters 102 102 102 88 88 88 88 79 79 79 79 
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190 1,039 1,039 1,039 1,039 927 927 927 927 
R-squared 0.025 0.041 0.059 0.125 0.138 0.138 0.141 0.160 0.164 0.169 0.169 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. For more details on the 
explanatory variables we refer to the notes below Table A.2 and section 6.1. of the paper. 
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A.4.2. Reporting bias regarding the use of the konou 
Full results for the estimation of Eq.(5) and Eq.(6) are presented in Tables A.16 and A.17 
respectively. 
To verify whether the fluctuations in shrimp fishing revenue across open and closed 
weeks are caused by a natural cyclicality in fishing activities rather than the fishing committee 
rule, we run a falsification test. We implement the test by comparing the fluctuations of fishing 
revenue at lake Nokoué with those of lake Ahémé, another coastal lake in southern Benin close 
to lake Nokoué (see Figure 1). At this lake the socio-ecological system and nature of fishing 
activities are similar to lake Nokoué. The key differences for our purpose are the absence of 
the fishing committee rule and the fact that the government prohibited the use of the konou at 
lake Ahémé (and this prohibition is well enforced).  
Our falsification test takes the form of a difference-in-differences analysis, which 
allows us to examine whether the fluctuations in shrimp fishing revenue at lake Nokoué are 
significantly larger than fluctuations in shrimp fishing revenue for the control, i.e. lake Ahémé. 
Finding no significant difference between the two lakes would suggest that the fluctuations 
observed at lake Nokoué are caused by a cyclicality of fishing activities rather than the fishing 
committee rule. 
 We augment equations (5) and (6) with interaction terms between the sets of closed and 
open week indicator variables, and an indicator variable that takes value 1 for lake Nokoué 
(and 0 for lake Ahémé).3 We estimate the augmented regression equations for an extended 
household survey sample by adding 14 weekly observations for 116 fishermen living in 6 
villages at lake Ahémé. Table A.18 and A.19 presents the estimation results for closed and 
open weeks respectively. The coefficient estimates indicate that the drop in shrimp fishing 
revenue in the first closed weeks and the jump in shrimp fishing revenue in the first open weeks 
                                                          
3 This indicator variable for lake Nokoué is absorbed by the individual fixed effects. 
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are significantly larger at lake Nokoué compared to lake Ahémé. We therefore reject the 
hypothesis that the fluctuations in fishing revenue observed at lake Nokoué are merely the 
result of natural cyclicality.  
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Table A.16: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Shrimp fishing revenue in closed weeks 
(2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Closed first week -1.186*** -1.184*** -0.914*** -0.909*** -0.783*** 
 (0.277) (0.275) (0.238) (0.295) (0.253) 
Closed second week -0.505** -0.499** -0.325 -0.259 -0.094 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.210) (0.258) (0.221) 
Week  0.011 -0.025 -0.064 -0.002 
  (0.046) (0.043) (0.051) (0.044) 
(log) Fishing days   2.274*** 2.413*** 1.589** 
   (0.280) (0.812) (0.715) 
(log) Persons fishing    1.169 1.563 
    (1.032) (1.042) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
      
Constant 3.485*** 3.393*** 0.161 -0.941 -1.008 
 (0.083) (0.372) (0.517) (1.765) (1.724) 
      
Number of clusters 103 103 103 102 102 
Observations 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,197 1,184 
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.122 0.027 0.255 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled 
about 656 CFA in 2009. Week is a count variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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Table A.17: Individual fixed effects estimation results: Shrimp fishing revenue in open weeks  
(2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t   
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Open first week 1.513*** 1.512*** 1.275*** 1.244*** 1.169*** 
 (0.305) (0.303) (0.264) (0.312) (0.280) 
Open second week 1.179*** 1.174*** 1.004*** 0.995*** 0.670** 
 (0.346) (0.339) (0.304) (0.357) (0.311) 
Open third week 0.990*** 0.986*** 0.687** 0.733** 0.375 
 (0.347) (0.341) (0.301) (0.351) (0.319) 
Open fourth week 0.632** 0.631** 0.394* 0.328 0.228 
 (0.245) (0.242) (0.222) (0.269) (0.243) 
Week  0.003 -0.032 -0.069 -0.004 
  (0.046) (0.043) (0.050) (0.044) 
(log) Fishing days   2.278*** 2.373*** 1.558** 
   (0.278) (0.808) (0.705) 
(log) Persons fishing    1.184 1.568 
    (1.039) (1.047) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
      
Constant 2.487*** 2.462*** -0.547 -1.574 -1.483 
 (0.168) (0.421) (0.569) (1.820) (1.774) 
      
Number of clusters 103 103 103 102 102 
Observations 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,197 1,184 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.128 0.034 0.260 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 
656 CFA in 2009. Week is a count variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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Table A.18: Individual fixed effects estimation results 
Falsification test: Shrimp fishing revenue in closed weeks at two lakes (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Closed first week -0.233 -0.322* -0.245 -0.260* -0.272* 
 (0.192) (0.192) (0.148) (0.153) (0.160) 
Closed second week 0.393*** 0.365*** 0.239** 0.193* 0.092 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.105) (0.103) (0.108) 
Closed first week*Nokoué -1.078*** -1.005*** -0.681** -0.767** -0.566* 
 (0.349) (0.351) (0.290) (0.347) (0.318) 
Closed second week*Nokoué -0.911*** -0.918*** -0.541** -0.471 -0.186 
 (0.284) (0.285) (0.250) (0.305) (0.271) 
Week  -0.087*** -0.105*** -0.119*** -0.070** 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
(log) Fishing days   3.201*** 3.253*** 2.539*** 
   (0.194) (0.603) (0.567) 
(log) Persons fishing    2.493*** 2.671*** 
    (0.568) (0.570) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
      
Constant 5.516*** 6.235*** 1.053*** -1.045 -1.414 
 (0.049) (0.254) (0.384) (1.218) (1.139) 
      
Number of clusters 219 219 219 218 218 
Observations 2,939 2,939 2,939 2,576 2,532 
R-squared 0.013 0.023 0.221 0.073 0.213 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 
656 CFA in 2009. The baseline category for the indicator variable lake Nokoué is lake Ahémé. Week is a count 
variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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Table A.19: Individual fixed effects estimation results 
Falsification test: Shrimp fishing revenue in open weeks at two lakes (2009 household survey) 
Dependent variable: (log) Average weekly fishing revenue for shrimp in week t 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Open first week 0.353* 0.442** 0.298* 0.292* 0.321* 
 (0.189) (0.188) (0.160) (0.176) (0.188) 
Open second week 0.122 0.298 0.210 0.254 0.340* 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.170) (0.180) (0.189) 
Open third week -0.309 -0.155 -0.067 0.011 0.186 
 (0.256) (0.260) (0.206) (0.211) (0.215) 
Open fourth week -0.577*** -0.504*** -0.293* -0.231 -0.141 
 (0.187) (0.186) (0.152) (0.155) (0.156) 
Open first week*Nokoué 1.390*** 1.333*** 1.119*** 1.211*** 1.084*** 
 (0.371) (0.371) (0.316) (0.375) (0.356) 
Open second week*Nokoué 1.222*** 1.166*** 0.973*** 0.977** 0.550 
 (0.426) (0.428) (0.374) (0.437) (0.400) 
Open third week*Nokoué 1.358*** 1.305*** 0.762* 0.797* 0.174 
 (0.459) (0.461) (0.391) (0.449) (0.432) 
Open fourth week*Nokoué 1.184*** 1.135*** 0.579** 0.505 0.276 
 (0.324) (0.327) (0.291) (0.342) (0.313) 
Week  -0.092*** -0.109*** -0.122*** -0.072** 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
(log) Fishing days   3.192*** 3.209*** 2.485*** 
   (0.191) (0.602) (0.563) 
(log) Persons fishing    2.527*** 2.716*** 
    (0.560) (0.558) 
Other fishing gear No No No No Yes 
      
Constant 5.103*** 5.784*** 0.750* -1.342 -1.666 
 (0.100) (0.266) (0.390) (1.214) (1.130) 
      
Number of clusters 219 219 219 218 218 
Observations 2,939 2,939 2,939 2,576 2,532 
R-squared 0.019 0.031 0.227 0.079 0.219 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Fishing revenue is expressed in CFA; one euro equaled about 
656 CFA in 2009.  The baseline category for the indicator variable lake Nokoué is lake Ahémé. Week is a count 
variable that indicates the week of the survey period. 
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B. Additional information on data collection 
B.1. Details on the implementation of the 2009 household survey  
For the household survey, households were visited each two weeks during the survey period. 
During every visit, two modules were administered: the bi-weekly module and a one-time module. 
One-time modules were implemented during one visit only, and each module focused on a 
different theme (e.g. individual characteristics of household members, household assets, schooling 
and health). Bi-weekly modules were implemented each bi-weekly visit and collected information 
for the past two weeks (separately for each week) on revenues, expenditures and activities of 
fishers and fishmongers.  
As it was not possible to visit all households simultaneously in one week, households were 
divided into two groups. These groups were alternately visited during the survey period. In other 
words, each week one of the two groups was visited to collect bi-weekly information. This 
procedure implies that the first visit to one group of households took place one week earlier than 
the first visit to the second group of households. Similarly, the last visit to the second group of 
households took place one week after the last visit to the first group. Hence, although each 
household was visited bi-weekly during 14 weeks, the total time span of the survey was 15 weeks. 
Table B.1 illustrates this procedure in detail. 
Because of this implementation, in the first week we only have information on fishing 
activities for the first group of households; in the last week we only have information on fishing 
activities for the second group of households.  
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Table B.1: Illustration of the implementation of the bi-weekly module in the 2009 household survey 
Dates Week 
Household 
group visited 
Visit 
number for 
group 1 
Visit 
number for 
group 2 
Information gathered for 
group 1 
Information gathered for 
group 2 
April 13 - 19 1       visit 1: previous week none 
April 20 - 26 2 1 visit 1   visit 1: current week visit 1: previous week 
April 27 - May 3 3 2   visit 1 visit 2: previous week visit 1: current week 
May 4 - 10 4 1 visit 2   visit 2: current week visit 2: previous week 
May 11 - 17 5 2   visit 2 visit 3: previous week visit 2: current week 
May 18 - 24 6 1 visit 3   visit 3: current week visit 3: previous week 
May 25 - 31 7 2   visit 3 visit 4: previous week visit 3: current week 
June 1 - 7 8 1 visit 4   visit 4: current week visit 4: previous week 
June 8 - 14 9 2   visit 4 visit 5: previous week visit 4: current week 
June 15 - 21 10 1 visit 5   visit 5: current week visit 5: previous week 
June 22 - 28 11 2   visit 5 visit 6: previous week visit 5: current week 
June 29 - July 5 12 1 visit 6   visit 6: current week visit 6: previous week 
July 6 - 12 13 2   visit 6 visit 7: previous week visit 6: current week 
July 13 - 19 14 1 visit 7   visit 7: current week visit 7: previous week 
July 20 - 26 15 2   visit 7 none visit 7: current week 
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Our results are basically unchanged when we exclude the observations in the first and last 
week (i.e. weeks 1 and 15), with some minor changes in coefficient sizes for the variables of 
interest (results not reported, but available on request). We have therefore chosen to include the 
first and last weeks in our empirical analysis in order to take full advantage of the information 
available in the survey.  
B.2. Details on variable measurement and questions asked  
For both the 2009 household survey and the 2006 fishery census we provide a detailed exposition 
of how variables were measured and which questions were asked to obtain the necessary 
information. 
Information on religious adherence was obtained in the one-time module on household 
member characteristics by asking the following question: “What is the main religious confession 
of this person?”.4 The answer coding included a separate code for Voodoo or animism (animiste). 
Weekly information on the use of the konou was obtained in the fishing activity questionnaire of 
the bi-weekly module. The administrator asked the following question: “What fishing instruments 
have you used in the past two weeks?”5 and consequently read out loud a list of fishing instruments 
used at lake Nokoué. For each fishing instrument, the respondent indicated whether he had used it 
in the past week and the week before, up to a maximum of three instruments. If more than three  
fishing instruments had been used, the interviewer recorded the three most important ones. 
Included in the list of fishing instruments was the konou. 
The fishery census collected information on fishing activities and a limited number of 
socio-economic variables through a one-time visit. The census questionnaire inquired after 
                                                          
4 “Quelle est la principale confession religieuse de cette personne?”. 
5 “Quels engins de pêche avez-vous manipulés les 2 semaines passées?”. 
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religious adherence through a question about ‘religion’ (no full sentence was specified). The 
answer coding included a separate code for Voodoo or animism (Vodoun).6 
Information on the use of the konou was obtained in the census by asking the following 
question: “Which of these fishing instruments/techniques do you use?”7 One of the categories listed 
below this question was the konou.  
Information on the closing of the lake during the household survey period was obtained 
through semi-structured and open-ended interviews with members of the fishing committees.  
Table B.2 provides a summary of the variables used in our analysis and how information 
regarding these variables was collected in the survey and census.  
  
                                                          
6 Another answer category was ‘other traditional religions’. This answer category was not recorded in the entire 
census dataset, indicating that there are no other important traditional or animistic religions besides Voodoo in this 
region. 
7 “Lesquelles de ces unités/systèmes de pêches pratiquez-vous?”. 
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Table B.2: Summary of variables measured and questions asked 
Panel A: Household survey   
Question/Definition Variable measured 
"What fishing instruments have you used in the past two weeks?" Konou 
"What is the main religious confession of this person?" Voodoo 
Lake Nokoué was closed to the use of the konou during this week Closed 
Age Age 
"During how many years was this person in school (present, even 
without passing)?" 
Years of education 
Average daily earnings*days worked in 2008 per activity, summed 
across activitiesa 
Annual income  
Total number of persons living in the household Household size 
Ratio of dependent and active household membersb  Dependency ratio  
"Provide the total value in FCFA obtained from the sales of shrimp 
catches." 
Fishing revenue for shrimp 
"How many days have you fished in each of the two past weeks?" Number of fishing days 
"Who has accompanied you while fishing during the past two 
weeks?"  
Number of persons fishing 
"What fishing instruments have you used in the past two weeks?"  Other fishing gear 
Panel B: Fishery Census   
Question/Definition Variable measured  
"Which of these fishing instruments/techniques do you use?"  Konou 
Religion Voodoo 
Age Age 
Level of education (categories, not years) Education 
Number of dependent children Number of dependent children 
Ethnicity  Ethnicity 
Source: Author’s 2009 household survey implemented and 2006 fishery census implemented by the government 
of Benin (UCN/PMEDP/Direction des Pêches) for FAO. Notes:  
a: The corresponding questions in the survey are: "How many days per month did you engage in this activity in 
2008?" and "How much did you earn on average per working day from this activity (net, i.e. after deduction of 
costs)?" 
b: Dependent individuals are children (age<15) and elderly (age>60). Active members are individuals aged 
between 15 and 60. 
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C. The history of Voodoo and fisheries management in the south of Benin 
According to Pliya (1980), in pre-colonial times the traditional Voodoo governance institution 
managed to keep resource exploitation in check, even in the face of population growth. The system 
started to fail, however, when the colonization of Benin brought about profound socio-economic 
changes (Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980). The traditional politico-religious structures were 
undermined by new colonial and post-colonial powers, and these powers also introduced Christian 
religions that started to compete with Voodoo. As the power of Voodoo declined, the deterring 
effect of sanctions decreased. At the same time, the benefits of shirking increased with the rising 
value of fishery products following commercialization and market integration of the economy. The 
economic opportunities created by a growing fishing sector, combined with a booming population, 
brought about large flows of internal migration to the southern lakes. Newly settled agricultural 
communities started exploiting the lake resources as well, engaging in a competition with the 
communities who had been full-time fishers since pre-colonial times. These part-time fishers 
showed little respect for the traditional Voodoo system, fishing whenever and wherever they chose, 
openly disobeying rules and undermining the authority of Voodoo priests. The influx of outsiders 
thus further eroded the power of the Voodoo system and reduced the incentives to obey the rules 
(Pliya, 1980).  
The waning power of the traditional Voodoo institution led to an institutional vacuum, 
which the Beninese government attempted to fill by creating new governance institutions. Yet, 
these governmentally created institutions failed to effectively regulate fishing activities 
(Dangbégnon, 2000; Pliya, 1980). Rules were left unmonitored, sanctions were too lenient and 
punishments were rarely and inconsistently implemented. For instance, civil servants designated 
to inspect the use of fishing gear explained to us that in the run-up to elections, the incumbent 
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attempts to win the votes of fishers by halting monitoring and certainly sanctioning (see also 
Dangbégnon, 2000). Besides failing to effectively regulate the fishing activity, the central 
government undermined the authority of Voodoo priests and the traditional rules that they 
represented by creating new fishery management institutions and replacing traditional leaders with 
government administrations (Pliya, 1980).  For example, by enforcing the individual property 
claim of acadja owners8, the government broke with the long-established Voodoo principle that 
preserved the lake and its resources as common property (Pliya, 1980). 
Under the Marxist-Leninist regime in Benin (1972-1989) the government took a hostile 
attitude towards Voodoo, actively targeting it with anti-religious campaigns and laws against 
sorcery (Tall, 1995b). With the democratic renewal in the 1990s the tide turned: authorities 
actively supported the Voodoo religion and promoted it as a symbol of national identity and 
cultural heritage. Important signals of the new attitude towards Voodoo were the organization of 
an annual national Voodoo festival and the enlistment of Voodoo in the constitution as an official 
religion. The Voodoo religion regained vitality and became more and more organized as a national 
traditional religion (Tall, 1995b). 
 
 
                                                          
8 The acadja is a type of brush park fishery where branches are placed in the bottom of the lake and fenced with a 
fishing net. Owners guard their acadjas and allow no one else to harvest fish inside the fenced area. 
